HCD Letter Could Complicate Builder’s Remedy Approvals

On March 28, 2024, the Department of Housing and Community Development (“HCD”) issued a Letter of Technical Assistance[1] to the City of Compton that potentially creates a new complication to the approval of Builder’s Remedy projects. The Builder’s Remedy allows developments that meet certain affordability thresholds to bypass local zoning when a city or county is out of compliance with housing element requirements. As Reuben, Junius, and Rose partners Melinda Sarjapur and Matthew Visick explained in their April 24 update (State Law Could Overhaul “Builder’s Remedy”), some cities have pushed back on the validity of the Builder’s Remedy as a tool to overcome burdensome zoning controls, and there are numerous Builder’s Remedy cases making their way through the courts. The Builder’s Remedy is part of the Housing Accountability Act (“HAA”)—which provides that cities and counties must make one of five findings in order to deny a project that would create very low, low, or moderate income housing. One such finding states that a project’s inconsistency with a city or county’s zoning ordinance or general plan can only be used to reject the project if the city or county has adopted a compliant Housing Element. HCD’s March letter to the City of Compton confirms that when a city or county does not have a compliant Housing Element, it cannot deny a project that meets the requisite affordability thresholds because of the project’s inconsistency with the applicable zoning or general plan land use designation. However, HCD’s letter explains that the Builder’s Remedy does not prohibit a city or county from requiring Builder’s Remedy projects to obtain discretionary permits or zoning or general plan amendments that would be required for similar non-Builder’s Remedy projects. The letter notes that in this case, the City of Compton intended only for the required general plan amendment and zoning change “to remedy the inconsistencies between the project and applicable regulatory documents that will result when the project is approved.” Even so, the guidance cuts directly against the benefit that the Builder’s Remedy is arguably meant to provide—an open door for projects with sufficient affordability in jurisdictions that have failed to adopt a valid housing element. Significantly, the HCD letter goes on to explain that if a city or county’s insistence on a general plan amendment or zoning change makes a project infeasible, then that jurisdiction would be in violation of the HAA. The letter specifically notes that “if insisting on a GPA or Zoning Change delays project approval or increases the cost of the approval process, a violation of the HAA would result.” It is almost impossible to imagine how a requirement to pursue a zoning or general plan amendment wouldn’t delay a project or increase costs. Zoning and general plan amendments are legislative actions requiring approval by a city council or board of supervisors. Adding a legislative component to Builder’s Remedy projects automatically politicizes these approvals. The March letter to the City of Compton is a bit contradictory:  on the one hand, the HAA does not prohibit cities from requiring discretionary permits or legislative actions as part of Builder’s Remedy entitlements; but on the other hand, anything that delays project approval or increases costs would amount to an HAA violation. With numerous Builder’s Remedy cases making their way through the courts, and pending state legislation to revise the Builder’s Remedy, this HCD letter potentially muddies the water for Builder’s Remedy projects in the meantime. Authored by Reuben, Junius & Rose, LLP Attorney Chloe Angelis. The issues discussed in this update are not intended to be legal advice and no attorney-client relationship is established with the recipient. Readers should consult with legal counsel before relying on any of the information contained herein. Reuben, Junius & Rose, LLP is a full service real estate law firm. We specialize in land use, development and entitlement law. We also provide a wide range of transactional services, including leasing, acquisitions and sales, formation of limited liability companies and other entities, lending/workout assistance, subdivision and condominium work. [1] HCD RE: 1601 W. El Segundo Blvd., Compton – Letter of Technical Assistance (March 28, 2024).

Superior Court Invalidates SB9 in Charter Cities

On April 22, 2024, the Superior Court issued a decision in City of Redondo Beach et. all, vs. Rob Bonta, et. all.  This case centered on the legality of SB 9, which the state legislature passed in 2021.  The court held that the legislation was “not reasonably related to ensuring access to affordable housing nor narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary interference with local government,” thus was in violation of the “home rule” doctrine prohibiting interference with municipal affairs [of charter cities]. At the crux of the argument was whether the legislature’s stated intent of SB 9 – “ensuring access to affordable housing” – was effectuated in the legislation.  The court held that it was not. As a reminder, SB 9 requires that a proposed housing development containing no more than 2 units in a Single-Family residential zoning district be approved ministerially, and that an associated lot split be approved ministerially as well.  This legislation was one of many that the state legislature has passed in the last several years to require local municipalities to approve new housing projects. A key issue in the case was whether SB 9 violated charter cities’ authority to manage “municipal affairs.” The Court noted that under California jurisprudence a state law may overcome the home rule doctrine if it is reasonably related to the resolution of a matter of statewide concern. The Court then applied the four-part test from California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles to resolve the issue of whether SB 9 superseded local land use authority.  At the end of this test, if “the court is persuaded that the subject of the statute is reasonably related to its resolution [and not unduly board in its sweep] then the conflicting charter city law is no longer a municipal affair and the state law applies. The Court found, and the parties conceded, that land use and zoning regulations are traditionally local affairs and that SB 9 did indeed interfere with those powers.  On the third prong, whether SB 9 dealt with a matter of statewide concern, the parties sought to define what exactly the statewide concern at issue was. Petitioners sought to define the statewide concern as ensuring affordable housing, whereas respondents argued that the matter of statewide concern was addressing the state’s overall housing shortage. Here, the Court looked at the plain language of the law – SB 9’s legislative intent and purpose was simply “ensuring access to affordable housing is a matter of statewide concern and not a municipal affair” – and adopted a narrow reading of the Legislature’s intention.  It held that SB 9 was just about ensuring access to affordable housing, not about the shortfall of housing generally. When respondents argued that specific identification of affordable housing did not necessarily preclude a shortfall in housing from being a matter of statewide concern, the Court was unpersuaded. On the fourth prong of the inquiry (i.e. whether SB 9 is reasonably related to ensuring access to affordable housing and narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary interference), the Court first turned to the definition of “affordable” within the context of SB 9.  The Court held that the legislatures’ use of “affordable” in SB 9 was in the context of below market-rate housing.  It did not agree with the respondents that it meant housing affordability at all levels. The Court then held that the “broad requirement of ministerial approval of duplexes and urban lot splits does not contain any connection to affordable housing” (as defined as below market-rate units).  Therefore, since SB 9 does not contain any below market-rate requirements, there was no evidence that SB 9 would result in the creation of “affordable housing,” basically dashing the argument that SB 9 could satisfy the reasonably related/narrowly tailored prong. It is important to note that the Court went out of its way to distinguish SB 9 from SB 35 and SB 423, which have specific requirements for below-market rate housing units, and therefore were not subject to this ruling. Where does this leave SB 9?  There are 121 charter cities in California, many of them opposing not only SB 9 but other laws that force ministerial approval of housing projects.  However, many jurisdictions have approved SB 9 projects, including San Francisco.  Whether the Attorney General’s Office will appeal the ruling is not yet known, however, it is doubtful that this is the last we will hear about SB 9. Authored by Reuben, Junius & Rose, LLP Attorney Tara Sullivan. The issues discussed in this update are not intended to be legal advice and no attorney-client relationship is established with the recipient.  Readers should consult with legal counsel before relying on any of the information contained herein.  Reuben, Junius & Rose, LLP is a full service real estate law firm.  We specialize in land use, development and entitlement law.  We also provide a wide range of transactional services, including leasing, acquisitions and sales, formation of limited liability companies and other entities, lending/workout assistance, subdivision and condominium work.

State Law Could Overhaul “Builder’s Remedy”

Assemblymember Buffy Wicks has introduced Assembly Bill 1893 (“AB 1893”) to “modernize” the so-called “Builder’s Remedy” that allows projects with enough affordable units to bypass local zoning requirements when a city or county is out of compliance with Housing Element Law.   This month, California Attorney General Rob Bonta announced his sponsorship of the bill. The Builder’s Remedy is part of the state’s Housing Accountability Act (“HAA”) that has been in effect for over 30 years. It prohibits local governments that haven’t met Housing Element deadlines from denying an application to build a housing project based on inconsistency with local zoning controls or a general plan designations so long as the project meets certain affordability requirements. The Builder’s Remedy has laid idle for decades, but gained visibility and application over the past couple years as the Legislature has continued to strengthen state housing laws and numerous cities dropped the ball on meeting Housing Element deadlines.  It is no longer idle.  Housing advocacy groups have aggressively promoted the Builder’s Remedy, characterizing it as a “zoning holiday.”  Recent news coverage estimates that there are 93 Builder’s Remedy projects across the state that could deliver as many as 17,000 new housing units.[1] Some cities have attempted to push back against the Builder’s Remedy as an unacceptable intrusion of state law into local land use permitting decisions.  These attempts have been met forcefully by the State Department of Housing and Community Development which has issued numerous advisory letters explaining that failure to process Builder’s Remedy projects could expose a city or county to liability under the HAA.  The Attorney General’s office has also intervened in litigation to enforce the Builder’s Remedy.  Just last month Los Angeles County saw the first court case victory for developers on a Builder’s Remedy project in La Caňada Flintridge, and a fleury of other cases are pending.  News coverage suggests that cities and counties have refused to process nearly half of the Builder’s Remedy applications filed based on arguments that it doesn’t actually apply, has been misinterpreted, or is itself unconstitutional.[2] Developers have also pointed out the difficulty in meeting the affordability requirements of the Builder’s Remedy.  Projects must either provide 20% of the units at prices affordable to low-income households or 100% of the units at prices affordable to moderate income households.  Given current financial constraints, these affordability levels are often infeasible to meet. AB 1893 would overhaul the Builder’s Remedy in a number of ways: Revised Affordability Requirements. AB 1893 would replace the 20% low-income threshold with a 10% very-low-income threshold.  The 100% threshold for moderate-income projects would remain. Projects with 10 units or fewer would be exempt from affordability requirements. Limiting Where Builder’s Remedy Can Apply. Currently, there is no restriction on what sites can apply the Builder’s Remedy. AB 1893 would only allow such projects on sites that permit housing, retail, office, or parking, or agricultural use if 75% of the site perimeter adjoins a site developed with urban uses.  Builder’s Remedy would not apply on a site or adjoined to any site where more than 1/3rd of the existing square footage is dedicated to industrial uses. Capping Density. AB 1893 would generally cap the residential density of Builder’s Remedy projects to two- to three-times that otherwise permitted by local zoning, depending on whether the site is located in a high-resource area. Additional density (in an amount not yet specified) could be permitted for sites within ½ mile of a major transit stop. Imposing Objective Development Standards. AB-1893 would require Builder’s Remedy projects to comply with objective zoning standards for the closest zone that allows multifamily residential use at specified density minimums, or if no such district exists, the zone that allows the greatest density in the locality. Integrating the Builder’s Remedy with Other State Housing Laws. Among other items, this legislation prohibits local agencies from applying objective standards to Builder’s Remedy projects that would physically preclude their construction at the allowed densities or increase “actual costs.” It further clarifies that Builder’s Remedy projects can utilize State Density Bonus Law; that projects meeting residential density standards of AB 1893 will be deemed to satisfy objective density standards for streamlined ministerial development under AB 2011; and that projects meeting residential density and objective criteria of AB 1893 can qualify for qualify for streamlined, ministerial processing under SB 35. As currently written, AB 1893 would not apply to Builder’s Remedy projects with applications deemed complete on or before April 1, 2024. The Attorney General argues that AB 1893 is needed to “clarify and modernize” the Builder’s Remedy by “providing clear, objective standards for builder’s remedy projects, including density standards and project location requirements.”  It argues that these revisions will make the Builder’s Remedy into “a more effective enforcement tool because local governments will face greater certainty of swift consequences when they do not adopt a timely and substantially compliant housing element.”  Finally, the Attorney General argues that AB 1893 will yield better projects by incentivizing “development in urban infill and near transit centers, and promoting higher density housing that is more affordable than single-family homes.” Opponents argue that AB 1893 will reduce the amount of affordable housing generated and reduce local control over land use permitting decisions. We understand that some parties (including the Housing Action Coalition and YIMBY Action) are advocating for including the provisions of AB 1893 as an alternative to the existing Builder’s Remedy, but leaving the existing Builder’s Remedy in place for projects that are able to meet the increased affordability requirements and do not wish to be constrained by AB 1893’s limitations on location, density, and design. AB 1893 passed from the Assembly Committee on Housing and Community Development and Local Government on April 17, 2024.  It will next be considered by the Assembly Committee on Local Government.  If it is signed into law this year, it would take effect in January 2025. [1] California’s most controversial housing law, the ‘builder’s remedy,’ could get a makeover – Local News Matters [2] Id.

Board of Supervisors Downzones Historic Districts Over Mayor’s Veto

Last week, the Board of Supervisors voted to override Mayor London Breed’s veto and passed legislation that will effectively downzone certain historic districts in the C-2 zoning district. According to the San Francisco Chronicle, this is the first time the Board has overturned Mayor London Breed’s veto. It also marks a reversal of the trend towards increasing density and eliminating numerical density limits in the City. In the C-2 zoning district, formed-based zoning currently applies east of or fronting Franklin Street/13th Street and north of Townsend Street, meaning that instead of numerical caps on the number of units, the density is controlled by other development standards like height, bulk, setbacks, open space requirements, etc. The switch to form-based zoning in portions of the C-2 zoning district was just enacted in July 2023 as part of the Downtown Economic Revitalization legislation, which was unanimously approved. Now, the Board of Supervisors passed legislation to revert back to numerical density limits in the C-2 district for properties within the Northeast Waterfront Historic District, the Jackson Square Historic District, and the Jackson Square Historic District Extension. This will limit density based on the density ratio permitted in the nearest residential zoning district, but no less than one unit per 800 square feet of lot area. The legislation exempts projects utilizing the Commercial to Residential Adaptive Reuse Program from the numerical density limits. President Aaron Peskin, who sponsored the legislation, stated that it is a reaction to the “unintended consequence” of projects taking advantage of the form-based density in the C-2 zoning district in conjunction with the State Density Bonus Law to propose towers in these historic districts. Public comments specifically referred to State Density Bonus Projects at 1088 Sansome and 955 Sansome, which were proposing a total of 264 housing units. The Mayor vetoed the legislation, calling it “anti-housing policy in the guise of historic protection.” Supervisors Melgar and Dorsey expressed concerns that as the City moves towards maximizing housing, this legislation would create a problematic precedent that individual supervisors can carve out exceptions to density decontrols. But ultimately, the Board voted 8-3 to override the Mayor’s veto, with Supervisors Melgar, Dorsey, and Engardio voting with the Mayor and against the legislation. It remains to be seen whether these types of piecemeal exceptions to form-based density will continue to be enacted in response to specific projects. But either way, the Planning Department’s staff report aptly noted that a portion of the area affected by this legislation is currently included in the Planning Department’s rezoning effort in accordance with the Housing Element. If that rezoning scenario is pursued, the staff report states that the Department will likely recommend reinstating form-based density, and approximately 23 parcels that will be subject to numerical density controls under this legislation will revert to form-based zoning within the next year. This begs the question how many other areas will be subject to this type of legislative whiplash as the City grapples with balancing the need for additional housing and preserving neighborhood character. Authored by Reuben, Junius & Rose, LLP Attorney Sabrina Eshaghi. The issues discussed in this update are not intended to be legal advice and no attorney-client relationship is established with the recipient.  Readers should consult with legal counsel before relying on any of the information contained herein.  Reuben, Junius & Rose, LLP is a full service real estate law firm.  We specialize in land use, development and entitlement law.  We also provide a wide range of transactional services, including leasing, acquisitions and sales, formation of limited liability companies and other entities, lending/workout assistance, subdivision and condominium work.

Voters Approve Mayor’s Transfer Tax Exemption

The Mayor’s proposal to waive San Francisco’s Transfer Tax for certain converted residential space (“Measure C”) was approved by voters on March 5, according to the City of San Francisco’s official preliminary election results. We previously provided an overview of this measure that is aimed at encouraging conversion of office to residential use in the City on October 25, 2023. Generally, under the new law, up to the first 5,000,000 square feet of “Converted Residential Property” can be exempted from the City’s Transfer Tax. Conversions that involve demolition of nonresidential property to construct new residential property may also be considered Converted Residential Property subject to the tax exemption. However, the measure caps the amount of new square footage that can be considered Converted Residential Property. For projects where a building is demolished to construct new residential property at the same site, the amount of Converted Residential Property only includes residential square feet in the new building that exceeds the square feet of any residential space in the demolished building, up to a maximum of the total gross floor area of the non-residential space in the demolished building, plus 10%. According to SPUR, the approval of Measure C comes with the following benefits: Acceleration of office to residential conversion projects can speed downtown recovery through reducing the cost of development; Activating obsolete office buildings with housing can increase foot traffic and economic activity; The Board of Supervisors can make future changes to the transfer tax as needed legislatively, allowing flexibility for the City to make adjustments based on economic conditions The tax exemption under Measure C applies to the First Transfer of Converted Residential Property—meaning the first transfer after a certificate of final completion and occupancy or temporary certificate of occupancy is issued for the property, whichever is earlier. So, projects will generally see the benefits of Measure C once construction is complete. The passage of Measure C alone is not expected to close the feasibility gap for most office to residential conversion projects, and additional incentives will be needed to make such projects financially viable. Authored by Reuben, Junius & Rose, LLP Attorney Kaitlin Sheber. The issues discussed in this update are not intended to be legal advice and no attorney-client relationship is established with the recipient.  Readers should consult with legal counsel before relying on any of the information contained herein.  Reuben, Junius & Rose, LLP is a full service real estate law firm.  We specialize in land use, development and entitlement law.  We also provide a wide range of transactional services, including leasing, acquisitions and sales, formation of limited liability companies and other entities, lending/workout assistance, subdivision and condominium work.

Legal Victories for CEQA Streamlining

Earlier this month, the California Court of Appeal ruled that a qualifying development project in San Diego County could use the County’s General Plan Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”) to streamline the project’s environmental review, over the objections of neighbors and the County’s Board of Supervisors. A similar result was recently achieved in San Francisco.  RJR partner Tuija Catalano secured a victory at the Board of Supervisors for a housing project, with the Board determining that the project properly used San Francisco’s recently certified Housing Element EIR to streamline CEQA processing for the project. The Court of Appeal’s opinion further strengthens the use of CEQA streamlining and exemption provisions and validates San Francisco’s established process of “tiering” project specific CEQA review off its General Plan and Area Plan EIRs. In San Diego, County planning staff determined that a recycling plant project that was consistent with the County’s most-recent General Plan could be evaluated for a CEQA evaluation pursuant to CEQA Guidelines Section 15183, which generally limits the CEQA evaluation for a project consistent with a General Plan (including a Housing Element) or an Area Plan to potential unique (“peculiar”) impacts. After several technical studies confirmed the recycling center project did not result in significant or peculiar impacts not already evaluated in the General Plan EIR, County staff prepared a 15183 evaluation with mitigation measures from the General Plan EIR’s Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Program. If that fact pattern sounds simple enough, the administrative CEQA review process was actually more complicated and unfavorable for the developer: the developer originally pursued an initial study to prepare either an EIR or Negative Declaration before pivoting to a 15183 evaluation only after all of the background technical studies were completed.  The Board of Supervisors sided with neighbors and upheld an administrative appeal over the recommendation of the staff to deny the appeal. The trial court also sided with the Board of Supervisors. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision with a surprisingly straightforward opinion. Importantly, the Court held that the project could pivot to a 15183 evaluation and confirmed the eligibility of this streamlining evaluation for projects using a General Plan or Area Plan. The Court next found that the Supervisors failed to base their conclusions on any substantial evidence in the record. It also explicitly rejected layperson testimony from neighbors at the Board of Supervisors appeals hearing (related, it also confirmed that the substantial evidence standard—which is less deferential—applied even when a court reviews a city or county’s determination an exemption is not applicable). The crux of the Court’s argument: the Board of Supervisors failed to identify the specific nature of the … project’s ‘peculiar’ impacts that required environmental review, except to point to broad environmental categories. Nor did the Board of Supervisors address, with specificity, the effect of uniform policies and procedures on their purported impacts. Hilltop Group, Inc., et al v. County of San Diego, et al. (2024) ___ Cal.App.5th ___. The Court’s opinion confirms the use of 15183 can be appropriate, even for a large-scale project like a recycling plant, and should make cities and counties more comfortable using their General Plan or Area Plan EIRs on larger-scale projects. The opinion also emphasizes that politics only goes so far when an administrative record is lacking: a city or county cannot simply decree that a certain environmental topic addressed in a 15183 exemption— for example, preservation—is not adequately analyzed. The local agency needs to provide specifics with adequate factual and legal backing (as mentioned above, “lay opinion and personal observations” by neighbors was not substantial evidence). And that determination needs to address why mitigation measures or otherwise-applicable laws could not further reduce or eliminate the peculiar impacts. Closer to home, San Francisco has a 15-year history of using CEQA Guidelines Section 15183 in the context of Plan Area EIRs (such as Eastern Neighborhoods Plan Area EIR and Central SoMa Plan Area EIR) to issue Community Plan Evaluations for projects within the applicable Plan Areas. With the certification of San Francisco’s Housing Element (2022 Update) EIR in November 2022, many projects outside Area Plans became eligible for similar streamlined CEQA review based on the General Plan (i.e. Housing Element) EIR that applies Citywide. On February 6, 2024, the Board of Supervisors heard the first CEQA General Plan Evaluation appeal, and with a 10-1 vote the Board found that the use of Section 15183 streamlining provision based on the Housing Element EIR was proper.  The recent Board of Supervisors appeal decision, as well as the San Diego Court of Appeal opinion are important.  Cities and counties can look to these decisions to support streamlined process based on General Plan EIRs on projects that are consistent with the development density within the General Plan policies. The Board decision and the Court of Appeal opinion are especially good news for projects that are located outside Area Plans that until now were required to complete a negative declaration or an EIR if they were not eligible for any of the categorical CEQA exemptions.   uthored by Reuben, Junius & Rose, LLP Attorneys Tuija Catalano and Mark Loper. The issues discussed in this update are not intended to be legal advice and no attorney-client relationship is established with the recipient.  Readers should consult with legal counsel before relying on any of the information contained herein.  Reuben, Junius & Rose, LLP is a full service real estate law firm.  We specialize in land use, development and entitlement law.  We also provide a wide range of transactional services, including leasing, acquisitions and sales, formation of limited liability companies and other entities, lending/workout assistance, subdivision and condominium work.

Courts Draw New Boundaries in Property Line Cases

Two recent California court decisions, involving all-too-common neighbor disputes, have provided new guidance concerning easements and property ownership. In Romero v. Shih (S275023 [2024]), the California Supreme Court ruled that a neighbor (Sierra Madre, L.A. County) can acquire an exclusive right to a driveway easement by implication even where all of the elements of adverse possession are not met, namely, where the party claiming an easement has not paid taxes on the land in question.  The Court reversed the Court of Appeal, which had held that as a matter of law, such an easement could have been created only by a written instrument.  According to the Court of Appeal, the key fact was that the easement was “exclusive”.  Because it was used as a driveway, no other use of the property was possible.  Given the significance of this property right, such an easement could be created only by a written instrument. The California Supreme Court disagreed.  The driveway had existed and been used by the neighbor for at least 30 years.  The two properties had been bought and sold over the years, but the respective deeds made no mention of the driveway.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found that a writing evidencing the easement wasn’t necessary, nor was it necessary that all of the elements of adverse possession be met.  The Court concluded that an easement by implication can be created where any reasonable person observing the two properties and an existing driveway would have assumed the neighbor using the driveway retained at least some continuing interest in the disputed strip of land. The key facts were that for over 30 years, between the original separation of the properties and the discovery that the user of the driveway didn’t actually own the property, every successive owner of either property had allowed for and/or behaved as if the easement owner had the right to encroach upon the disputed strip of land with the driveway, which had remained unchanged in its use and function since at least the initial property separation.  This was enough to establish an implied easement. The case of Goodhart, et al v. Honeybadger Acquisitions (A165781 [2023]) concerned the creation of an “equitable easement” in Tiburon.  For over ten years, the Goodharts improved and maintained approximately 950 square feet of land, believing the area was part of their front and rear yards.  The defendant discovered the area was his property when he commissioned a survey in connection with his plan to build a perimeter fence.  After defendant commenced construction of the fence, the Goodharts brought suit, seeking injunctive relief and a declaration that they are entitled to an equitable easement to use the disputed area. The court’s decision was not a final judgment but rather granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the easement claimant (Goodhart) was “likely to prevail on the merits”.  The court explained that an [equitable] easement over the trespassed-upon property in the trespasser’s favor is created if the trespasser shows that (1) her trespass was ‘ “innocent” ’ rather than ‘ “willful or negligent,” ’ (2) the public or the property owner will not be ‘ “ ‘irreparabl[y] injur[ed]’ ” ’ by the easement, and (3) the hardship to the trespasser from having to cease the trespass is ‘ “ ‘greatly disproportionate to the hardship caused [the owner] by the continuance of the encroachment.’ ” ’ ”  (Shoen v. Zacarias (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 16, 19.) The court found that the Goodharts’ trespass was innocent because they thought the property was theirs.  As to potential injury to the defendant property owner and the balancing of harms, the court found this favored the Goodharts.  If the defendants built a fence on the true property lines as planned, it would come within two feet of the Goodharts’ driveway and front steps and the back of their house, and the Goodharts would lose approximately 950 square feet of their yards.  In comparison, the disputed areas constituted less than 1% of the defendants’ property and was located downhill from their residence on undeveloped hillside that was largely unusable to them.  Under these circumstances, the Goodharts were entitled to an equitable easement over the subject area of defendant’s property. Authored by Reuben, Junius & Rose, LLP Attorney Thomas Tunny. The issues discussed in this update are not intended to be legal advice and no attorney-client relationship is established with the recipient.  Readers should consult with legal counsel before relying on any of the information contained herein.  Reuben, Junius & Rose, LLP is a full service real estate law firm.  We specialize in land use, development and entitlement law.  We also provide a wide range of transactional services, including leasing, acquisitions and sales, formation of limited liability companies and other entities, lending/workout assistance, subdivision and condominium work.      

Expanding Housing Choice: SF Finalizes Draft Rezoning Proposal

The San Francisco Planning Department has released more details on its Expanding Housing Choice Program, a citywide rezoning that will primarily target the city’s westside. The rezoning proposal originates in the city’s 2022 Housing Element Update, which was adopted last January, and requires the city to rezone to allow for approximately 36,000 housing units in order to meet its regional housing need allocation (RHNA) goal. Much like last year’s Constraint’s Reduction Ordinance legislation, the Expanding Housing Choice Program proposes sweeping changes to the Planning Code that are meant to spur housing development. These changes include upzoning along various transit and commercial corridors, relaxing of development standards and density controls, adoption of objective design standards, and the creation of a local “housing program” to rival the state’s density bonus law. The most visible–and perhaps most controversial–aspect of the Expanding Housing Choice Program is the proposed upzoning along commercial and transit corridors in the city’s “well-resourced neighborhoods”.  At the end of January, the Planning Department released its final draft proposal map, which would see height limits of 65-85 feet (or 6-8 stories) on most major streets on the westside, where near uniform 40-foot (4 stories) height limits have reigned for decades. Although the proposal may look simple at first glance, it should also be noted that the draft map shows “final heights” that are intended to be the maximum height after the application of any density bonuses, and the actual base height limits will be lower than those shown on the draft map. On February 1, 2024, the Department gave an informational presentation on the rezoning to the Planning Commission, and it was met with several hours of public comment. Many residents expressed disagreement over the upzoning, including concerns about the loss of quieter neighborhoods, impacts to traffic and infrastructure, and displacement of longtime residents and commercial uses. The comments were well received by the Planning Commission, who asked Department staff to consider altering the proposal to address the comments. If last year’s Constraints Reduction Ordinance is any indication, it is likely that the upzoning proposal will be modified several times and go through several heated hearings at the city’s Board of Supervisors, Land Use committee, and Planning Commission. A less controversial aspect of the Expanding Housing Choice Program includes the creation of a new “local housing program” that will provide an alternative to the state density bonus law that has risen in popularity in recent years. The new local housing program will offer housing projects various development benefits, such as density bonuses and streamlined processing, in exchange for providing affordable housing units. Unlike the state density bonus, however, which gives developers the ability to override development standards, the local housing program will give the city more control over these projects’ physical aspects and design character. In addition to these major changes, the city will also adopt objective design standards to streamline project review and give projects more certainty from the initial design phase. Other changes include “density decontrol” along transit and commercial corridors, which will remove hard density limits (i.e. 2 units per lot) and allows projects to construct as many units as would reasonably fit within the envelope of a code-complying project. The proposal would also provide an alternative way to comply with the city’s inclusionary housing requirements by allowing small developments (less than 25 units) to provide units as rent-controlled units rather than BMR units. While the Planning Department has finalized its Expanding Housing Choice proposal after almost a year of outreach and public engagement, the legislation still needs to be introduced, reviewed, and adopted by the city’s legislative body. Due to the wide-reaching changes and controversial reaction to the proposal so far, we expect it will continue to evolve over the coming months.

The Basics: Are you really covered as an additional insured?

Leases, construction contracts, easement agreements, and other contracts often require one party to name the other as an “additional insured” under its liability insurance policy.  The insuring party often provides its counterpart with a “certificate of insurance.”  The receiving party may believe that the insuring party complied with its obligations.  But unless an additional insured endorsement is issued, the negotiated risk transfer to the insuring party’s insurance carrier was not accomplished. A certificate of insurance is nothing more than evidence of insurance.  It typically identifies the insurance carrier, states the kinds of coverage that are maintained, and outlines the insured’s policy limit(s).  A certificate does not provide additional insured status to the certificate holder. Additional insured status may be conferred by a “scheduled” or “blanket” additional insured endorsement.  A “scheduled” endorsement is specific to the additional insured, includes its name on the endorsement, and amends the insurance policy: Section II—Who Is an Insured is amended to include as an additional insured the person(s) or organization(s) shown in the Schedule. . . . (Insurance Services Office, Inc. (“ISO”) endorsement CG 20 10).  When an insured who is frequently required to provide additional insured coverage to other parties (e.g., a subcontractor), its insurance carrier may simply include a “blanket” additional insured endorsement in the policy.  Such endorsements may identify the “Name of Additional Insured Person(s) Or Organizations(s)” as follows: Any person whom you have agreed in a written and executed contract, prior to an “occurrence”, that such person or organization be added as an additional insured on your policy. (ISO CG 20 10 12 19).  But the coverage is typically limited by the endorsement.  For instance: If coverage provided to the additional insured is required by a contract or agreement, the insurance afforded to such additional insured will not be broader than that which you are required by the contract or agreement to provide for such additional insured. Additional limitations often appear, including: If coverage provided to the additional insured is required by a contract or agreement, the most we will pay on behalf of the additional insured is the amount of insurance: Required by the contract or agreement; or Available under the applicable limits of insurance; Whichever is less. (ISO CG 20 10 12 19 (2018)).  The limitations outlined in additional insured endorsements are important because the additional insured may receive less coverage than it might otherwise expect, or none at all. An example highlights the issues: A construction contract requires a contractor to procure and maintain a minimum of $5,000,000 in liability insurance coverage.  The contractor assumes indemnity obligations and agrees to provide $5,000,000 in additional insured coverage for the benefit of the property owner.  The parties agree that the contractor will cause its subcontractors to indemnify and provide additional insured status to the owner and contractor, and that any subcontractor that performs excavation will insure against subsidence risks.  The owner’s objective is to assure that if damage results from the excavation, the excavation subcontractor’s insurance company will defend the owner and pay the loss.  The owner intends to transfer the risk to the subcontractor’s insurance carrier. But when the contractor enters into its subcontracts, the excavation subcontractor is only required to carry $2,000,000 in liability insurance coverage, agrees to provide additional insured status to the contractor only, and is not explicitly required to carry subsidence coverage.  The contractor provides a certificate of insurance to the owner that (a) shows the owner as the certificate holder on a $10,000,000 liability insurance policy, and (b) attaches a blanket additional insured endorsement. During construction, the excavation subcontractor is negligent, and a neighboring property is damaged.  The owner asks the subcontractor’s insurance carrier to defend the claim.  But the insurance carrier will likely not defend or indemnify the owner, because the subcontractor did not agree to provide the owner with additional insured status.  If the carrier does provide coverage, it is likely that only $2,000,000 of the subcontractor’s $10,000,000 insurance coverage will be available.  Worse yet, the carrier may deny the claim entirely because the loss was caused by land subsidence, and the excavation subcontractor did not agree to provide that coverage (even if the subcontractor’s policy actually insures against that risk).  The insurance carrier will rely on the language of the blanket additional insured endorsement to support its positions. When parties negotiate risk transfer provisions, they intend that losses will be allocated between them (and their insurance carriers) in a particular way.  But the risk transfer is not typically complete when the contract is signed.  Business owners and property owners will be well-served by paying attention to the details of insurance coverage – before there is a problem – to assure that their objectives are achieved. Authored by Reuben, Junius & Rose, LLP Attorney Corie A. Edwards. The issues discussed in this update are not intended to be legal advice and no attorney-client relationship is established with the recipient.  Readers should consult with legal counsel before relying on any of the information contained herein.  Reuben, Junius & Rose, LLP is a full service real estate law firm.  We specialize in land use, development and entitlement law.  We also provide a wide range of transactional services, including leasing, acquisitions and sales, formation of limited liability companies and other entities, lending/workout assistance, subdivision and condominium work.

court cases

Leases V. Licenses and Eviction Rights

The question has been previously raised – is a lease the same as a license – in that does the underlying occupant/user acquire tenancy rights by such occupation regardless of whether you define an agreement as a license or a lease.  A recent case – Castaic Studios, LLC vs. Wonderland Studios (97 Cal.App.5th 209) – discusses an important aspect of this issue.  In Castaic, Wonderland, as licensee, defaulted under a license agreement and the licensor, Castaic, elected to seek an unlawful detainer action to remove the licensee, only to be told by the lower court that it was not an available remedy under the license.  Here, Castaic granted Wonderland the “exclusive” but “non-possessory” right for the use of the property.  The license stated it was “not a lease or any other interest in real property but a contractual arrangement that creates a revocable license”.  The licensor waived the right to an unlawful detainer under the license agreement and the license provided it would be governed by “contract laws and not by the landlord tenant laws”.  It further stated, that upon a default, the licensee agrees that licensor may cease to provide access to the licensee’s area of use without notice or the need to initiate legal process. The Courts of Appeal analyzed the contract to determine if the remedy of unlawful detainer applied here.  They stated that the fundamental goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time they entered into the contract.  Further, in interpreting the contract, the court gives the words their ordinary and popular meaning, unless the parties have given the words a specialized or technical meaning.  Here, the Court stated that even if the license contains some elements of a lease, its express terms show the parties’ intent to waive any rights afforded by the landlord tenant laws, including a landlord’s remedy of unlawful detainer. Castaic argued that the waiver should not be enforced.  The Court disagreed based on two principles: (1) the parties have the power to determine the terms of their contractual relationships and (2) other than a law established for a public reason, any person may waive the advantage of a law intended for its benefit.  Here, Castaic waived the right to bring an action for unlawful detainer and the Court saw no public reason that would prohibit a landowner from agreeing to waive the unlawful detainer remedy.  Finally, the Court stated that the existence of a landlord tenant relationship was essential to an unlawful detainer action. Castaic highlights that if an agreement is clear that it is a license and not a lease, the courts will review on the plain terms of the language of that license and the parties’ intent.  In this case, the Court found that the parties were explicit that an unlawful detainer remedy was unavailable to the licensor and nothing outside the language of the license would allow it to be implied otherwise.